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ABSTRACT: The species category is defined as the smallest historical individual within 
which there is a parental pattern of ancestry and descent. The use of historical individual in 
this definition is consistent with the prevailing notion that species per se are not involved in 
processes -- they are effects, not effectors. Reproductive isolation distinguishes biparental 
historical species from their parts, and it provides a basis for understanding the nature of 
the evidence used to discover historical individuals, 
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Species is one of the most important concepts in organismic biology. 
Reference to the species category or some binominal taxon, such as H o m o  
sapiens, is commonplace, and some even consider species to be the unit of 
fundamental evolutionary significance (Eldredge 1985, p. 159; Howard 
1988; Patterson 1988, p. 66). A species concept can be traced at least to 
Aristotle (Dewey 1910), and it has been debated vigorously from seem- 
ingly all perspectives: philosophical, operational, typological, populational 
and historical. The most recent discourse concerns the class-individual 
dichotomy (Ghiselin 1974; Hull 1978). It has been especially helpful 
because the species category is distinguished as a class from particular 
species which are instances of that kind (see, however, Rieppel 1986; 
Cracraft 1987, p. 343; Mishler and Brandon 1989). 
Still, the species problem persists, and it is complicated by: (1) con- 
fusing the ontological status of species with how to individuate species 
operationally; (2) disagreeing over the role species play in evolutionary- 
ecological theory; (3) applying different species concepts to biparental and 
uniparental organisms; (4) and insisting on applying the rule of monophyly 
to all species. The first three topics are reviewed in the body of the text to 
follow; the fourth complication is considered only in Notes 1, 3, 5 and 8 
(see also Kluge 1989a). 
I. BIOLOGICAL AND PHYLOGENETIC SPECIES CONCEPTS 
The prevailing opinion is that genealogical taxonomies must be restricted 
418 ARNOLDG. KLUGE 
to individuals because only they have history (Cracraft 1987, p. 351; Frost 
and Wright 1988, p. 201). For example, Mishler and Donoghue (1982), 
Cracraft (1983, 1987), Donoghue (1985), Mishler and Brandon (1987), 
and McKitrick and Zink (1988) reviewed the popular biological species 
concept (e.g,, Mayr 1942, p. 120; "species are groups of actually or 
potentially interbreeding natural populations, which are reproductively 
isolated from other such groups"), and the principal problem they 
identified with that concept is that reproductive communities do not 
necessarily correspond to well corroborated clades. Such inconsistency 
seems to be especially true in plants (Chris Humphries, pets. comm.). 
All the aforementioned reviewers argued for an alternative phylogenetic 
(evolutionary) species concept, which has three things in common: (1) 
empirically investigating species with a cladistic analysis of synapomor- 
phies scored among individual organisms (where ideally organism means 
entire life-cycle) or local populations of interbreeding organisms (demes) 
as terminal taxa (e.g., Kluge 1969, 1988; de Queiroz and Donoghue 
1988); (2) employing the rule of monophyly to achieve a consistent, 
genealogical taxonomy; ~ (3) attributing the category species to one of the 
least inclusive clades "within which there is a parental pattern of ancestry 
and descent" (Cracraft 1983, p. 170). 
According to Mishler and Donoghue (1982; see also Mishler and 
Brandon 1987, p. 406; 1989), the species category is "the smallest 
'important' lineage deemed worthy of formal recognition, where 'impor- 
tant' refers to the action of those processes that are dominant in producing 
and maintaining lineages in a particular case." Donoghue (1985, p. 179) 
would simply give "species rank to the smallest recognizable monophyletic 
or unresolved units" (see also Rosen 1978, 1979; Nelson and Platnick 
1981; Cracraft 1983, 1987; McKitrick and Zink 1988). Mishler and 
Donoghue's (1982; see also Mishler and Brandon 1987; de Queiroz and 
Donoghue 1988) treatment is unsatisfactory because the pluralistic solu- 
tion they propose for the 'species problem' "is the 'null hypothesis' that we 
should attempt to refute" (Sober 1984a, p. 341; see also Ghiselin 1987, 
1989; Frost and Wright 1988). I believe there are two reasons why 
Donoghue's (1985) position will not be accepted widely. As I will discuss 
in detail below, it does not take into account the fact that species are 
generally considered to be products of evolution (lineages), but not the 
units participating in processes (neither the replicators or interactors; Hull 
1980). Secondly, as the smallest clade, the species category is likely to be 
trivialized by the large numbers of taxa that will be recognized, and such 
taxa are likely to be unstable nomenclatorially. Further, Ereshefsky (1989) 
has criticized all the current formulations of the phylogenetic species 
concept on the grounds that they teach us little about the nature of 
species. 
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II. SPECIES AS HISTORICAL INDIVIDUALS 
It is clear that species are not classes (e.g., Ghiselin 1974; Hull 1978, 
1980; see, however, Nelson 1989a). Moreover, as noted above, the 
species-as-individuals perspective seems to be carrying the day (see also 
Sober 1984a; Ghiselin 1987, 1988; Hull 1987; Ridley, 1989). However, 
are species typical individuals? 
Mishler and Brandon (1987; see also de Queiroz and Donoghue 1988) 
provided a recent review of the class-individual dichotomy in which they 
distinguished four conditions of individuality: (1) spatial boundaries, (2) 
temporal boundaries, (3) cohesion, and (4) integration. They pointed out 
(p. 399) that "the former [1--2] refer to 'patterns,' i.e., effects of biological 
processes, and the latter [3--4] refer directly to the action of processes" 
(see Cracraft 1989a, for a lengthy discussion of cohesion and integration). 
All of the more inclusive clades, such as higher monophyletic taxa, which 
might be given the categorical rank of genus, family, etc., are spatio- 
temporally restricted; however, processes of cohesion and integration have 
not been associated convincingly with those groups. According to Cracraft 
(1989a, p. 42), "the only evidence for suggesting that 'cohesive processes' 
might be operable is the temporal and spatial continuity of a particular 
patte~n of character variation. The reality of one or more 'cohesive 
processes' is another question altogether." To be sure, the congruent 
synapomorphies exhibited by higher taxa might be interpreted as circum- 
stantial evidence of cohesion, a "sticky" process (Eldredge 1985), but 
common ancestry explains the presence of shared apomorphies equally 
well (de Queiroz and Donoghue 1988). Thus, as Ghiselin (1987, p. 141) 
succinctly summarized our current understanding, "genera and higher taxa 
never do anything." 
In contrast to higher taxa, all four conditions of individuality apply to 
demes. While the unity of demes is obviously a function of the action of 
cohesive and integrative processes, such as mating and reproduction, 
demes are also spatiotemporally restricted, if only for relatively short 
periods of time (Figure lb, c). Perhaps our best examples of individuals 
are organisms (Hull 1978). 
Wiley (1981b, pp. 74--76) referred to higher monophyletic taxa as 
"historical groups" because only the two conditions of pattern apply. I 
believe an equally strong case can be made for considering species taxa to 
be historical groups. In the remainder of this paper, I refer to any 
monophyletic taxon that is not involved in processes as a historical 
individual; the term contemporary individual is reserved for those entities 
that are spatiotemporally restricted and are directly involved in cohesive 
and integrative processes (other terms have been used by Hull 1978; and 
Wiley 1980, 1981b). As a rule, according to Cracraft (1989a), if the 
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actions of an individual can be ascribed to the additive actions of included, 
smaller, units of diversity then that individual is termed historical. 
The category species, as a class concept, is defined. Moreover,  as 
Ghiselin (1988, pp. 468--469;  see also Cracraft 1989a, p. 44) stated, 
"what individuals populate the world and what roles they play in evolution 
and other processes are empirical questions to be answered by reference 
to the data of experience." Therefore,  it is appropriate to summarize 
common knowledge pertaining to species (a more detailed review will 
be presented in Kluge, ms.) before defining the species category. For 
example, biparental species are viewed generally as forming lineages 
(Figure 1), and I think it is fair to say that biparental species are also 
understood to be polymorphic (Figure 2; Hennig 1966, Figure 6), and 
often polytypic when geographically widespread (Hull 1980, p. 324). 
Rarely is a single, uniform deme referred to as a species. Also, only five 
classes of processes seem to have been attributed frequently to species: 
evolution (anagenesis), speciation (cladogenesis), extinction, dispersal, and 
ecological interactions, such as competition (Ghiselin 1987; Cracraft 
1989a). 
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Fig. 1. The relationship between anagenesis and cladogenesis in biparental organisms. (a) 
Two novelties (x and y) originate independently, and spread among the parts of a deme. A 
horizontal line denotes mating; a vertical line symbolizes an organism's ontogeny from 
conception to death. (b) The novelties spread among demes. The coalescing lines depict 
the temporary nature of demes, due to dispersal of organisms or the union of entire 
reproductive communities. (c) The novelties cannot spread beyond the bounds of repro- 
ductively isolated lineages. Modified after Simpson (1955, Figure 48). 
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Fig. 2. "The total structure of hologenetic relationships and the differences in form 
associatcd with its individual parts" (Hennig 1966, p. 31). Modificd aftcr Hennig (1966, 
Figurc 6). 
Lewontin (1970) outlined the few conditions necessary and sufficient 
for evolution by natural selection, and he recognized species as one of the 
units in the traditional organizational hierarchy that could possibly be 
involved in that process. However, Hull (1980; see also Damuth 1985) 
concluded that species is an unlikely candidate because the necessary 
conditions of replication and interaction do not seem to apply to that 
unit} Various group selection arguments and examples (e.g., Stanley 1975; 
Jablonski 1987) have been examined, and none appears to be convincing 
(Levinton 1988; Russell and Lindberg 1988). The same conclusion 
pertains to species adaptations; while possible, they don't appear to apply 
(Williams 1966; Sober 1984b). Vrba's (1980) effect hypothesis, which 
does not assume adaptation (Schoch 1986), seems to have fared no better 
in explaining interspecific "macroevolutionary" patterns (Damuth and 
Heisler 1988). 
The familiar notion of new species originating from ancestral species by 
anagenesis alone, the non-lineage concept of speciation held commonly by 
paleontologists (see, however, Gauthier et  al. 1988), might also suggest 
a process in which species p e r  se are participants. However, upon close 
inspection all the examples of common ancestral species seem to be 
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ambiguous (e.g., the stratophenetic common ancestors of Gingerich 1979), 
or the common ancestors can be described more simply as parts of species 
(i.e., individual organisms or demes; Mishler and Brandon 1987, p. 409). 
What then is speciation? According to Hennig (1966, Figure 6; see also 
Futuyma 1987, p. 467), in biparental organisms it is the production of 
inherently hierarchical lineages. Further, the ancestry of such historical 
individuals is to be found among the parts of species, not among species 
per se, and the patterns of parent-offspring relationship (tokogenetic) 
at that level are inherently non-hierarchical (Cracraft 1989a, p. 49). 3 
Cracraft (1983, pp. 174--184, 1989b; see also Wiley 1981b) discussed 
novel ways to begin studying speciation (sensu Hennig's model). They 
involve assessing areas of endemism and their congruence, with the 
objective of distinguishing between dispersal and vicariance hypotheses 
(Kluge 1989b). In contrast, the populational view of speciation, that which 
accompanies the biological species concept, involves hypotheses of future 
evolution -- the actuality or potentiality of interbreeding (Darrel Frost, 
pers. comm.), which may explain why generalizations about populationai 
speciation have been so difficult to discover (e.g., Barigozzi 1982; Vrba 
1985). Although our current understanding may be preliminary and 
imperfect, speciation is sufficient to explain the origin of the diversity 
subsumed by all higher monophyletic taxa (Nelson 1989a). As Hennig 
(1981, p. 4) stated "All recent species are the physical descendants of 
ancient species, and so as we go back further into the past we are bound 
to encounter species that have given rise to more and more extensive 
groups of recent species." 
Usually, contemporary individuals are actually involved when species 
extinction, dispersal and ecological interactions are considered. Indeed, it 
is rare that all parts of a species go extinct at once; the causes of extinction 
tend to be local, not global, phenomena. Individual organisms may be 
expected to disperse, but it is rare that a whole species moves in a singular 
manner (Kluge 1989b). To say that species compete (parasitize, predate, 
etc.) seems to be even more of an overstatement. For example, Margalef 
(1968) argued convincingly that species do not have anything that could 
be considered a unitary ecology, and the competing entities are likely to 
be semaphoronts (Hennig 1966). Even the process of competing repro- 
ductively, which Ghiselin (1974) attributed to species, seems to be more 
accurately understood as an epiphenomenon on individual effects (Ruse 
1987). In summary, except for geographically restricted monotypic taxa, 
species do not appear to participate directly in evolutionary and ecological 
processes, only their parts do. As such, species usually do not act as 
cohesive wholes (see also Cracraft 1989a; Ereschefsky, ms.). 
Now, the question may be raised as to why the species category should 
not be defined as the smallest clade. In the preceding discussion I distin- 
guished between historical and contemporary individuals, and concluded 
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that species are examples of the former. Nonetheless, contemporary 
individuals, such as demes, have been diagnosed on occasion, and such 
delimitations may be expected to increase with the discovery of new 
molecular techniques. In those instances, the smallest clade would be too 
small for species, as historical individuals (Futuyma 1987, p. 467). 
Further, greater taxonomic instability is expected when contemporary 
individuals, such as demes, are equated with species taxa than when the 
chosen entities are historical individuals. There appear to be two reasons 
for the instability: (1) evidence of history may be difficult to discover 
because of the "microevolutionary" nature of novelties (continuous and 
polymorphic variations; Arnold 1981, pp. 16--19); (2) incompletely 
isolated lineages tend to generate homoplasy (e.g., incongruence due to 
segregation and recombination) and unresolved hypotheses of taxonomic 
relationships result because of conflicting character evidence. Species as 
the smallest clade will greatly increase the number of species taxa, but that 
does not necessarily mean there will be an improved understanding of 
pattern and process (contra Cracraft 1989b). The quality and the amount 
of the evidence on which our phylogenetic hypotheses are based must also 
be taken into consideration. 
Thus, I define the species category as the class whose members are the 
smallest historical individuals within which there is a parental pattern of 
ancestry and descent? Operationally, particular species, like other his- 
torical groups, are delimited with synapomorphies; recognition of species 
is not a matter of having a defining property or set of properties (contra 
Nelson and Platnick 1981). My definition of the species category empha- 
sizes Hennig's (1966) view that there is a break at the species level, with 
reticulating genealogical relationships predominating among the parts of a 
species, but not among species (Figure 2). Under my definition, species 
are real, at least as much as any monophyletic higher taxonomic hypothesis 
is real, but species are probably not the fundamental unit of evolution -- 
neither replicator or interactor. According to Cracraft (1989a, p. 50), 
"Species are much like developmental pathways within the ontogeny of 
individual organisms: both are effects rather than effectors, They are 
epiphenomena, developed or evolved from lower-level processes. Both are 
thus historical entities or 'by-products'." 
Does the species category become less important when defined as a 
historical individual? In one sense it does, but in another it does not. With 
few exceptions, species can be no longer viewed as the players in the 
evolutionary and ecological theatre (Kawata 1987, p. 419), and con- 
sequently we lose the opportunity to formulate natural laws about the 
class species in those contexts. Nonetheless, species are the lineages which 
change indefinitely through time as the result of those processes (Hull 
1980, p. 327), and laws remain to be discovered at lower, population- 
organism, levels (Ghiselin 1988). At least conceptually, species, as the 
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smallest historical individuals, will be the same among clades, and such a 
conceptualization provides a comparable unit with which taxonomic 
diversity might be studied quantitatively. Moreover, my definition requires 
that pattern be distinguished from process, and in that regard I believe our 
understanding of the nature of diversity will improve. Any definition that 
confounds the two will surely lead to misunderstanding. 
IlL REPRODUCTIVE ISOLATION 
I agree that reproductive isolation should not be a part of a species 
definition (McKitrick and Zink 1988, pp. 5, 8; see also Mishler and 
Donoghue 1982, p. 498) because reproductive isolation and the cladistic 
hierarchy may not be perfectly correlated (Figure 3). However, I argue 
that reproductive isolation is an important relation (not interbreeding) in 
distinguishing historical from contemporary individuals (see also McKitrick 
and Zink 1988; Ridley 1989), 5 and it provides a basis for understanding 
the nature of the evidence used to discover historical groups. Mayr (1963; 
see also Cracraft 1983, p. 163; Eldredge 1985) also recognized explicitly 
many years ago the general importance of reproductive isolation. Mayr 
stated (p. 31) that "the primary criterion of species rank of a natural 
population is reproductive isolation. The degree of morphological differ- 
ence displayed by a natural population is a by-product of the genetic 
discontinuity resulting from reproductive isolation." (I assume Mayr's 
"degree of morphological difference" can be equated to number of 
A B C B A C 
Fig. 3. (a) The true phylogeny. (lo) The pattern of relationships based on interbreeding 
(taxa A and C interbreed, but neither does with B). Modified after McKitrick and Zink 
(1988, Figure 1). 
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congruent synapomorphies.) Still, the parts of a species may not have 
anything in common but reproductive isolation. 
Admittedly, divergence and reproductive isolation are not perfectly 
coupled because the former can occur in the absence of the latter, i.e., in 
the context of geographic isolation alone. As Cracraft (1989a, p. 53) 
pointed out, "all reproductive isolation manifests differentiation, but .not 
all differentiation is manifested as reproductive isolation." Also, as noted 
above, the least inclusive clade can be reproductively isolated, but that 
does not mean more plesiomorphic sister taxa are reproductively isolated 
from each other (Figure 3; McKitrick and Zink 1988, p. 8). Still, repro- 
ductive isolation is the only process that guarantees, for the indeterminate 
future, the individuality of lineages of organisms; geographic isolation by 
itself does not (Futuyma 1987, p. 467). As Mishler and Donoghue (1982, 
p. 495) stated, "the importance of reproductive barriers is that groups that 
are reproductively isolated for long periods of time are at least evolu- 
tionarily independent (whether or not they diverge morphologically), 
making them effectively separate entities." It is in this way that reproduc- 
tive isolation and historical individuality are connected. A more limited 
species concept that defines species only as the smallest clade (e.g., 
Cracraft 1983; Donoghue 1985) does not distinguish reproductively and 
geographically isolated individuals. 
The shared traits that provide systematists with evidence of sister group 
relationships are assumed to originate by mutation and/or recombination 
(Figure l a). The taxonomic generality of traits is affected proximally by 
interbreeding and/or reproduction, and ultimately by reproductive isola- 
tion. The first two processes account for the increased appearance of a 
novelty, horizontally and vertically (Figure la), while the last stops its 
spread. In biparental organisms, interdemic geographic isolation (Figure 
lb) tends to retard the diffusion process of traits, but only reproductive 
isolation actually confines it (Figure lc). It is in this way that divergence, 
levels of character generality, and reproductive isolation are connected. 
There seem to be three possible explanations for the presence of 
synapomorphies at the same level of taxonomic generality: lack of char- 
acter independence, sampling artifact, and reproductive isolation. Pro- 
cesses such as genetic linkage can produce similar patterns of character 
covariation; however, systematists do not knowingly use such characters in 
assessing clades because they are not independent evidence of history 
(Kluge 1989c). Likewise, failure to sample all lineages, extant or extinct, 
can be viewed as a methodological problem over which the investigator 
has some control. The effect of reproductive isolation is another matter -- 
the length of time a lineage of biparental organisms is isolated and the 
effectiveness of the isolation being the critical parameters. That is, two or 
more novelties that appear independently in different parts of a reproduc- 
tive community (Figure la) will in time proceed to the same limit set by 
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reproductive isolation (Figure lc)J' Such exact character congruence (con- 
firmation) might be useful in operationalizing my species-as-historical- 
individual definition because it implies the presence of effective isolation 
and historical individuality. Also, emphasizing corroborated taxa ensures 
some measure of taxonomic stability, sensu the spatiotemporal limits of 
the hypothesized historical entities. 
Mishler and Brandon's (1987, p. 397; see also de Queiroz and 
Donoghue 1988) ranking criterion of species is pluralistic, in the sense 
that whatever causal processes are deemed "most important in producing 
and maintaining lineages in a particular case" are to be employed. My 
definition of the species category is monistic; however, there is more than 
one way it can be operationalized. For example, application of Nelson's 
(1983) cladistic methodology for discovering hybrids might suggest the 
presence of ineffective isolation, and the categorical rank of species would 
then be attributed to a more inclusive clade, one that does not appear to 
be involved in hybridization. Abrupt changes in a homoplasy profile 7 
(Kluge 1971) might also be used to adjust the rank of species to a larger 
clade. It is worth noting that hybridization and homoplasy analyses 
provide estimates of cohesion and integration (see Mishler and Brandon 
1987, pp. 399--400). Also, both analyses employ the same evidential 
basis used to discover the groups in the first place (synapomorphies as 
putative homologues), and in that sense the importance of those analyses 
in adjusting the rank of species follows from cladistic principles. Systema- 
tists interested in species per  se might also search for apomorphies that 
are causally connected to reproductive isolating mechanisms (including 
specific mate recognition characters, sensu Paterson, 1985; see also Coyne 
et al. 1988, p. 193), and those apomorphies could be used to assemble 
demes into clades. Thus, additional importance may be attached to my 
particular monistic view of the species category because it is part of a 
larger coherent theory, phylogenetic systematics (Mishler and Donoghue 
1982, p. 495). Of course, the simplest operational context is to observe 
parts of sister lineages in sympatry, which would be considered pr ima 
facie evidence for reproductive closure and historical individuality. 
IV. UNIPARENTAL SPECIES 
The preceding discussions of the phylogenetic species concept, species-as- 
historical-individual definition, and reproductive isolation are couched in 
terms of biparental organisms, and greater generality would obtain if my 
ideas also applied to uniparentals. To begin with, there is no reason to 
believe that uniparentals can't be analyzed cladistically, even though they 
don't form lineages (sensu Hull 1980), and there is evidence that uni- 
parental and biparental taxa exhibit similar unity (Mishler 1985). In the 
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absense of horizontal transfer of novelties, one might expect to find 
numerous large polytomies relatively more frequently in uniparentals. Still, 
there should be no more difficulty applying the rule of monophyly to 
uniparentals than to biparentals because that convention is blind to 
sexuality. Further, clades of uniparental organisms are historical individ- 
uals, like higher taxa, because according to Ghiselin (1987, p. 141) "they 
don't do anything either." Therefore, a uniparental species would be the 
smallest clade, and as historical individuals, uniparental species are no 
longer "pseudospecies" (Ghiselin 1987, p. 138; 1989)Y 
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NOTES 
The monophyly convention ensures that taxonomies are complete systems of sister 
group relationships, where each such system contains all the descendants of the most 
recent common ancestor of the system. Thus, monophyly achieves logically consistent 
phylogenetic hypotheses and taxonomies (Hull 1964; Wiley 1981a), which is viewed by 
some as the cornerstone of cladistics (Nelson 1989a; see, however, Note 3). Like Nelson 
(1989b), I see no purpose in considering monophylysis to be a natural process (contra de 
Queiroz and Donoghue 1988; see also Mishler and Brandon 1987). 
2 Ereshefsky (1988, p. 221; see, however, Cracraft 1989a, p. 43) has argued that "the 
individuality of a group is neither necessary nor sufficient for its being a unit of selection", 
and "that the individuality of a species is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of 
the Theory of Punctuated Equilibrium." 
3 It is widely held that species evolve from other species, and this means that species taxa 
can't all be required to be monophyletic. Thus, in the phylogenetic system all monophyletic 
taxa are hypothesized individuals, but not all individuals can be monophyletic (contra 
Rowe 1987, p. 210). Hennig understood this asymmetry perfectly (1981, p. 29). That 
ancestral species can't be monophyletic should present few if any practical problems in 
taxonomy because ancestral species are difficult to individuate (Donoghue et al. 1989). In 
any case, special taxonomic conventions are available to flag non-monophyletic ancestral 
species taxa if they were to be discovered (Wiley 1981 b; Kluge 1989a). 
4 My definition of species is similar to Simpson's (1961; see also Wiley 1978) --  "an 
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evolutionary species is a lineage (an ancestral-descendant sequence of populations) evolv- 
ing separately from others and with its own unitary evolutionary role and tendencies." 
However, the conceptual contexts in which the definitions are developed are quite different 
(Frost and Hillis 1989). 
Donoghue's (1985) metaspecies and Wiley's (198 l b) sedis mutabilis conventions can be 
used to distinguish non-monophyletic species taxa when the terminal taxa, individual 
organisms or demes, form unresolved plesiomorphic sister assemblages (Kluge 1989b). 
This of course assumes that geographic isolation within a reproductive community is 
only temporary. 
7 Homoplasy is assumed to be greater among the organisms and demes within a repro- 
ductively isolated lineage than it is among reproductively isolated lineages because repro- 
ductive closure necessarily limits the amount of homoplasy that can result from indepen- 
dent segregation and recombination. 
s Special problems in the taxonomy of uniparentals are reviewed by Frost and Wright 
(1988; see also Echelle 1990). 
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